Wide and narrow scope

Philosophical Studies 163 (3):717-736 (2013)
In this paper I present an original and relatively conciliatory solution to one of the central contemporary debates in the theory of rationality, the debate about the proper formulation of rational requirements. I begin by offering my own version of the “symmetry problem” for wide scope rational requirements, and I show how this problem necessitates the introduction of a normative concept other than the traditional notions of reason and requirement. I then sketch a theory of rational commitment , showing how this notion solves the symmetry problem as I’ve presented it. I also show that the concept of rational commitment is one we already appeal to in common sense discourse, and that it is necessary for vindicating comparative judgments of rationality.
Keywords Rationality  Normativity  Wide scoping  Broome
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9841-z
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 20,038
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Michael Bratman (1987/1999). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Center for the Study of Language and Information.

View all 32 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Sam Shpall (2014). Moral and Rational Commitment. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):146-172.
Mark Schroeder (2013). Scope for Rational Autonomy. Philosophical Issues 23 (1):297-310.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

368 ( #4,530 of 1,793,264 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

103 ( #4,527 of 1,793,264 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.