David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Synthese 50 (1):125 - 145 (1982)
The main question addressed in this essay is whether quarks have been observed in any sense and, if so, what might be meant by this use of the term, observation. In the first (or introductory) section of the paper, I explain that well-known researchers are divided on the answers to these important questions. In the second section, I investigate microphysical observation in general. Here I argue that Wilson's analogy between observation by means of high-energy accelerators and observation by means of microscopes is misleading, for at least three reasons. Moreover, so long as high-energy observation is accomplished by means of spark or bubble chambers, then sentences about these observations do not meet Maxwell's criterion, that observation statements are quickly decidable. I argue, however, that this criterion is not a good norm for what is observable in high-energy physics, both because it would result in our describing a great many allegedly observed particle events as unobserved or theoretical, and because it fails to distinguish the reasons why some observation statements might not be quickly decidable. Most important, Maxwell's criterion fails because, contrary to Hanson's analysis, it presupposes that seeing does not involve both seeing as and seeing that.With this background concerning what is meant by general microphysical observation, in the third section of the essay, I discuss what might be meant by a more particular type of observation, that of the quark via scattering events. I employ Feinberg's distinction concerning observation of manifest, versus existent, particles and claim that the alleged indirect observation of quarks as existent particles is really based on a retroductive inference. I explain which premise in the retroductive argument appears most open to the charge of being theoretical (in a damaging sense) and less substantiated by observation.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Herbert Feigl & Grover Maxwell (eds.) (1962). Scientific Explanation, Space, and Time: Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science. University of Minnesota Press.
Michael Radner & Stephen Winokur (eds.) (1970). Analysis of Theories and Methods of Physics and Psychology: Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science. University of Minnesota Press.
K. Shrader-Frechette (1977). Atomism in Crisis: An Analysis of the Current High Energy Paradigm. Philosophy of Science 44 (3):409-440.
K. S. Shrader-Frechette (1979). High-Energy Models and the Ontological Status of the Quark. Synthese 42 (1):173 - 189.
Citations of this work BETA
Shannon Vallor (2009). The Pregnancy of the Real: A Phenomenological Defense of Experimental Realism. Inquiry 52 (1):1 – 25.
Scott Campbell (2006). The Potential Information Analysis of Seeing. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):102–123.
Kostas Gavroglu (1989). Simplicity and Observability: When Are Particles Elementary? Synthese 79 (3):89 - 100.
Similar books and articles
Anna Estany (2001). The Thesis of Theory-Laden Observation in the Light of Cognitive Psychology. Philosophy of Science 68 (2):203-217.
P. Kosso (2000). The Empirical Status of Symmetries in Physics. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (1):81-98.
Darren Bradley (2011). Confirmation in a Branching World: The Everett Interpretation and Sleeping Beauty. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (2):323-342.
Robert Nola (1990). Some Observations on a Popperian Experiment Concerning Observation. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 21 (2):329-346.
Harold I. Brown (1987). Observation And Objectivity. Oxford University Press.
Miklavž Vospernik (2004). Measurement and the Verificationist Theory/Observation Distinction. Acta Analytica 19 (33):95-117.
D. G. Ellson (1963). The Scientists' Criterion of True Observation. Philosophy of Science 30 (1):41-52.
Henry A. Finch (1960). Confirming Power of Observations Metricized for Decisions Among Hypotheses. Philosophy of Science 27 (3):293-307.
Jerry A. Fodor (1984). Observation Reconsidered. Philosophy of Science 51 (March):23-43.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads4 ( #258,815 of 1,102,883 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #297,281 of 1,102,883 )
How can I increase my downloads?