Online research in philosophy

Galileo's Dialogue (1632) can be read from the viewpoints of methodological judgment and critical reasoning; methodological judgment means the avoidance of onesidedness and extremes; and critical reasoning means reasoning aimed at the analysis and evaluation of arguments. Classic sources for these readings are Thomas Salusbury (1661) and the Port-Royal logicians (1662). This focus does not deny the book's scientific, historical, rhetorical, and aesthetic dimensions; it is critical of excessively rhetorical readings; and it suggests solutions to the problems of hermeneutical pluralism, interpretation versus evaluation, and theory versus practice. The book's methodological judgment and critical reasoning can be shown to correspond to Galileo's self-reflections.

Scientific reasoning has long been an integral part of critical thinking taxonomies. In practice, however, it is frequently limited to induction, hypothesis testing and experimental design, thereby neglecting the central importance of modeling to contemporary scientific reasoning. In this paper, I wish to establish that this neglect undermines the possibility of critical engagement with the public discourse surrounding scientific reasoning. As a step towards rectifying that disconnect, I present one resource that I have developed to teach modeling in an introductory critical thinking course.

Critical thinking, considered as a version of informallogic, must consider emotions and personal attitudesin assessing assertions and conclusions in anyanalysis of discourse. It must therefore presupposesome notion of the self. Critical theory may be seenas providing a substantive and non-neutral positionfor the exercise of critical thinking. It thereforemust presuppose some notion of the self. This paperargues for a Foucauldean position on the self toextend critical theory and provide a particularposition on the self for critical thinking. Thisposition on the self is developed from moretraditional accounts of the self from Descartes toSchopenhauer, Nietzsche and Wittgenstein.

Part one: Acquiring critical thinking skills -- Out of the fog : the pathway to critical thinking -- Nuts and bolts : the basics of argument -- Analysis : the heart of critical thinking -- Handling claims, drawing inferences -- The logic machine : deductive and inductive reasoning -- Part two: Sharpening the tools -- The persuasive power of analogies -- Fallacies, fallacies : steering clear of argumentative quicksand -- Roll the dice : causal and statistical reasoning -- Syllogisms -- Patterns of deductive reasoning: rules of inference -- Part three: Going out into the world -- Out of the silence: the power of language -- Desire and illusion: analyzing advertising -- Web sight : critical thinking and the internet -- Voices and visions : the media -- Clearing the path : legal reasoning.

In this paper I defend the claim that, contrary to common assumptions, a comparison between Adorno's and Wittgenstein's reflections on language is of use in the development of a linguistic transformation of Critical Theory. Wittgenstein's reflections can be brought into a fruitful dialogue with Adorno's remarks on the function of concepts. The concept of reification was for a long time the basic concept of a critical theory of society. Nowadays it seems to be discredited. Wittgenstein's approach to linguistic analysis makes it possible to use this concept in a new way.

William James has been characterized as “the major whipping boy of the later Wittgenstein,” and the currency of this impression of the relation between James and Wittgenstein is understandable. Reading Wittgenstein and his commentators can leave one with the impression that James was a badly muddled “exponent of the tradition in the philosophy of mind that [Wittgenstein] was opposing.” There have been recent attempts to resist this trend, but even these tend to focus on the affinities between the two philosophers, still accepting the prevailing view that Wittgenstein was often critical of James, and that in such cases Wittgenstein was always right and James was always wrong. By contrast, by focusing on Wittgenstein’s discussion of James’s “if-feeling”, it will be argued that Wittgenstein’s criticisms of James are often not as damaging, or even as extensive, as has often been assumed.

Following Burge, many anti-individualists suppose that a subject can possess a concept even if she incompletely understands it. While agreeing that this is possible, I argue that there is a limit on the extent to which a subject can incompletely understand the set of concepts she thinks with. This limit derives from our conception of our ability to reflectively evaluate our own thoughts or, as Burge puts it, our ability to engage in critical reasoning. The paper extends Burge's own work on critical reasoning. He argued that critical reasoning imposes a limit on the extent to which we can be mistaken about what thoughts we are having; in general, we can know non-empirically what we are thinking (Burge, "Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society XCVI, 1996). He does not explicitly consider whether critical reasoning also imposes a limit on incomplete understanding of thoughts.

In this era of increased polarization of opinion and contentious disagreement, CRITICAL REASONING presents a cooperative approach to critical thinking and formation of beliefs. CRITICAL REASONING emphasizes the importance of developing and applying analytical skills in real life contexts. This book is unique in providing multiple, diverse examples of everyday arguments, both textual and visual, including hard to find long argument passages from real-life sources. The book provides clear, step-by-step procedures to help you decide for yourself what to believe--to be a consumer of information in our contemporary "world of experts.".

Do other people's arguments tie you in knots? Do you lack the confidence in your ability to reason? Do you assume that everything written in newspapers must be true? We all engage in the process of reasoning, but we don't always pay attention to whether we are doing it well. This book offers the opportunity to practice reasoning in a clear-headed and critical way, with the aims of developing an awareness of the importance of reasoning well, and of improving the reader's skill in analyzing and evaluating arguments. In this second edition of the highly successful Critical Reasoning , Anne Thomson has updated and revised the book to include new and topical examples which will guide students through the processes of critical reasoning in a clear and engaging way.