David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Studies 70 (2):117 - 132 (1993)
Recent discussions of consequentialism have drawn our attention to the so-called “self-other” asymmetry. Various cases presented by Michael Slote and Michael Stocker are alleged to demonstrate a fundamental asymmetry between our obligations to others and ourselves.1 Moreover, these cases are taken to constitute a difficulty for consequentialism, and for the various versions of utilitarianism in particular. I agree that there is a fundamental asymmetry between our obligations to ourselves and to others, and that this fact is inconsistent with the letter of traditional utilitarianisms. However, I do not think this represents a deep shortcoming of the spirit behind utilitarianism. In this paper I will argue that the self-other asymmetry can be accommodated in a broadly utilitarian framework. First, in section one, I characterize moral “asymmetry” in general. Then, in section two, I argue that the cases presented by Slote and Stocker do indeed represent a genuine self-other asymmetry. In part, this involves criticism of an attempt to accommodate the asymmetry within a preferentist framework. Finally, I will present my own solution to the problem of self and other
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Christina Hoff Sommers (1986). Filial Morality. Journal of Philosophy 83 (8):439-456.
John Cottingham (1983). Ethics and Impartiality. Philosophical Studies 43 (1):83 - 99.
Michael Slote (1984). Morality and Self-Other Asymmetry. Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):179-192.
Michael Stocker (1976). Agent and Other: Against Ethical Universalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 54 (3):206 – 220.
Citations of this work BETA
Douglas W. Portmore (2007). Consequentializing Moral Theories. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (1):39–73.
Douglas W. Portmore (2009). Consequentializing. Philosophy Compass 4 (2):329-347.
Douglas W. Portmore (2008). Dual-Ranking Act-Consequentialism. Philosophical Studies 138 (3):409 - 427.
Scott Hill (2011). An Adamsian Theory of Intrinsic Value. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (3):273-289.
Similar books and articles
Melinda A. Roberts (2011). The Asymmetry: A Solution. Theoria 77 (4):333-367.
Jill North (2011). Time in Thermodynamics. In Criag Callender (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time. Oxford 312--350.
David Papineau (1992). Can We Reduce Causal Direction to Probabilities? PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:238-252.
John F. Post (1999). Is Supervenience Asymmetric? Manuscrito 22 (2):305-344.
T. V. Barchunova (2003). The Selfish Gender, or the Reproduction of Gender Asymmetry in Gender Studies. Studies in East European Thought 55 (1):3-25.
Silvia Stoller & tr Nielsen, Camilla (2005). Asymmetrical Genders: Phenomenological Reflections on Sexual Difference. Hypatia 20 (2):7-26.
Jill North (2003). Understanding the Time-Asymmetry of Radiation. Philosophy of Science 70 (5):1086-1097.
Adam Elga (2001). Statistical Mechanics and the Asymmetry of Counterfactual Dependence. Philosophy of Science 68 (S1):S313-.
Joseph Diekemper (2005). Presentism and Ontological Symmetry. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2):223 – 240.
Clay Splawn (2001). “The Self-Other Asymmetry and Act Utilitarianism.”. Utilitas 13 (3):323-333.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads47 ( #86,992 of 1,792,082 )
Recent downloads (6 months)8 ( #102,466 of 1,792,082 )
How can I increase my downloads?