Against monism
Analysis 67 (1):1–7 (2007)
| Abstract | Jonathan Schaffer distinguishes two sorts of monism. Existence monists say that only one object exists: The World. Priority monists admit the existence of The World’s parts, but say that their features are derivative from the properties of The World. Both have trouble explaining the features of statespace, the set of possibilities available to The World | |||||||||
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Arthur Edward Maddock (1936). Scientific Monism. London, J. Clarke & Co., Ltd..
Max Velmans (2007). Reflexive Monism. [Journal (Paginated)] (in Press) 15 (2):5-50.
Alexander Skiles (2009). Trogdon on Monism and Intrinsicality. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):149 – 154.
Kelly Trogdon (2009). Monism and Intrinsicality. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):127 – 148.
Jonathan Schaffer (2007). From Nihilism to Monism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):175 – 191.
Tuomas E. Tahko & Donnchadh O'Conaill (2012). On the Common Sense Argument for Monism. In Philip Goff (ed.), Spinoza On Monism. Palgrave Macmillan.
Jonathan Schaffer, Monism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Jonathan Schaffer, Monism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Uriah Kriegel (2012). Kantian Monism. Philosophical Papers 41 (1):23-56.
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