A sweater unraveled: Following one thread of thought for avoiding coincident entities

Noûs 32 (4):423-448 (1998)
One obvious solution to the puzzles of apparently coincident objects is a sort of reductionism - the tree really just is the wood, the statue is just the clay, and nothing really ceases to exist in the purported non-identity showing cases. This paper starts with that approach and its underlying motivation, and argues that if one follows those motivations - specifically, the rejection of coincidence, and the belief that 'genuine' object-destroying changes must differ non-arbitrarily from accidental changes, that one can plausibly be pushed to an extreme nihilism, that denies the existence of any objects at all.
Keywords coincident objects  nihilism  sortals  essential properties  substantial vs. accidental change
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DOI 10.1111/0029-4624.00133
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Daniel Z. Korman, Ordinary Objects. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Ned Markosian (2015). The Right Stuff. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (4):665-687.

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