David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Noûs 32 (4):423-448 (1998)
One obvious solution to the puzzles of apparently coincident objects is a sort of reductionism - the tree really just is the wood, the statue is just the clay, and nothing really ceases to exist in the purported non-identity showing cases. This paper starts with that approach and its underlying motivation, and argues that if one follows those motivations - specifically, the rejection of coincidence, and the belief that 'genuine' object-destroying changes must differ non-arbitrarily from accidental changes, that one can plausibly be pushed to an extreme nihilism, that denies the existence of any objects at all.
|Keywords||coincident objects nihilism sortals essential properties substantial vs. accidental change|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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Citations of this work BETA
Ned Markosian (forthcoming). The Right Stuff. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-23.
Alan Sidelle (2002). Is There a True Metaphysics of Material Objects? Philosophical Issues 12 (1):118-145.
Alan Sidelle (2009). Conventionalism and the Contingency of Conventions. Noûs 43 (2):224-241.
Iris Einheuser (2011). Toward a Conceptualist Solution of the Grounding Problem. Noûs 45 (2):300-314.
Francesco Berto (2013). Coincident Entities and Question-Begging Predicates: An Issue in Meta-Ontology. Metaphysica 14 (1):1-15.
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