David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (3):433 – 453 (1996)
Some philosophers believe that everyday objects are 4-dimensional spacetime worms, that a person (for example) persists through time by having temporal parts, or stages, at each moment of her existence. None of these stages is identical to the person herself; rather, she is the aggregate of all her temporal parts.1 Others accept “three dimensionalism”, rejecting stages in favor of the notion that persons “endure”, or are “wholly present” throughout their lives.2 I aim to defend an apparently radical third view: not only do I accept person stages; I claim that we are stages.3 Likewise for other objects of our everyday ontology: statues are statue-stages, coins are coin-stages, etc. At one level, I accept the ontology of the worm view. I believe in spacetime worms, since I believe in temporal parts and aggregates of things I believe in. I..
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References found in this work BETA
Saul A. Kripke (1980/1998). Naming and Necessity. Harvard University Press.
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David K. Lewis (1983). Philosophical Papers. Oxford University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Rachael Briggs & Daniel Nolan (2015). Utility Monsters for the Fission Age. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (2):392-407.
Bradford Skow (2011). Experience and the Passage of Time. Philosophical Perspectives 25 (1):359-387.
Brian J. Scholl (2007). Object Persistence in Philosophy and Psychology. Mind and Language 22 (5):563–591.
Peter J. Lewis (2007). Uncertainty and Probability for Branching Selves. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 38 (1):1-14.
Paul Tappenden (2011). Evidence and Uncertainty in Everett's Multiverse. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (1):99-123.
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