David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (3):433 – 453 (1996)
Some philosophers believe that everyday objects are 4-dimensional spacetime worms, that a person (for example) persists through time by having temporal parts, or stages, at each moment of her existence. None of these stages is identical to the person herself; rather, she is the aggregate of all her temporal parts.1 Others accept “three dimensionalism”, rejecting stages in favor of the notion that persons “endure”, or are “wholly present” throughout their lives.2 I aim to defend an apparently radical third view: not only do I accept person stages; I claim that we are stages.3 Likewise for other objects of our everyday ontology: statues are statue-stages, coins are coin-stages, etc. At one level, I accept the ontology of the worm view. I believe in spacetime worms, since I believe in temporal parts and aggregates of things I believe in. I..
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References found in this work BETA
Robert Merrihew Adams (1986). Time and Thisness. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 11 (1):315-329.
Richard Cartwright (1975). Scattered Objects. In Keith Lehrer (ed.), Analysis and Metaphysics. Reidel. 153-171.
Fred Feldman (1992). Confrontations with the Reaper: A Philosophical Study of the Nature and Value of Death. Oxford University Press.
Graeme Forbes (1983). Thisness and Vagueness. Synthese 54 (2):235-259.
Citations of this work BETA
Paul Tappenden (2011). Evidence and Uncertainty in Everett's Multiverse. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (1):99-123.
Mark Bajakian (2011). How to Count People. Philosophical Studies 154 (2):185 - 204.
Bradford Skow (2011). Experience and the Passage of Time. Philosophical Perspectives 25 (1):359-387.
Sarah Moss (2012). Four-Dimensionalist Theories of Persistence. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):671-686.
Peter Thomas Geach (2006). The Tractatus is Not All Rubbish. Analysis 66 (290):172-172.
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Kathrin Koslicki (2003). The Crooked Path From Vagueness to Four-Dimensionalism. Philosophical Studies 114 (1-2):107 - 134.
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Tobias Hansson Wahlberg (2009). Objects in Time: Studies of Persistence in B-Time. Dissertation, Lund University
Yuri Balashov (2007). Defining ‚Exdurance'. Philosophical Studies 133 (1):143 - 149.
Joshua M. Stuchlik (2003). Not All Worlds Are Stages. Philosophical Studies 116 (3):309-321.
Yuri Balashov (2002). On Stages, Worms, and Relativity. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 50:223-.
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