Composition as identity and emergent properties: reply to McDaniel
Graduate studies at Western
|Abstract||Composition as identity is the strange and strangely compelling doctrine that the whole is in some sense identical to its parts. Kris McDaniel (2008) argues that composition as identity rules out strongly emergent properties. I will argue that one version of the doctrine—namely, the most straightforward, albeit strangest, version—is resistant to the argument in an instructive way. What could it mean to say that one thing (such as a whole) is identical to many things (its parts)? That is indeed the $64,000 question. But however we answer it, McDaniel says, composition as identity had better be taken to imply the following principle.|
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