David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Noûs 43 (2):224-241 (2009)
One common objection to <span class='Hi'>Conventionalism</span> about modality is that since it is contingent what our <span class='Hi'>conventions</span> are, the modal facts themselves will thereby be contingent. A standard reply is that Conventionalists can accept this, if they reject the S4 axiom, that what is possibly possible is possible. I first argue that this reply is inadequate, but then continue to argue that it is not needed, because the Conventionalist need not concede that the <span class='Hi'>contingency</span> of our <span class='Hi'>conventions</span> has any bearing on the modal status of necessary truths. It is explained why this does not compromise the Conventionalist claim that necessity – and particularly, essence – is due to <span class='Hi'>conventions</span>.
|Keywords||conventionalism necessity modality|
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Citations of this work BETA
Tuomas E. Tahko (2015). Natural Kind Essentialism Revisited. Mind 124 (495):795-822.
Jamin Asay (2013). Truthmaking for Modal Skeptics. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (4):303-312.
Joshua C. Thurow (2013). The Defeater Version of Benacerraf's Problem for a Priori Knowledge. Synthese 190 (9):1587-1603.
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