David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Noûs 43 (2):224-241 (2009)
One common objection to Conventionalism about modality is that since it is contingent what our conventions are, the modal facts themselves will thereby be contingent. A standard reply is that Conventionalists can accept this, if they reject the S4 axiom, that what is possibly possible is possible. I first argue that this reply is inadequate, but then continue to argue that it is not needed, because the Conventionalist need not concede that the contingency of our conventions has any bearing on the modal status of necessary truths. It is explained why this does not compromise the Conventionalist claim that necessity – and particularly, essence – is due to conventions
|Keywords||conventionalism necessity modality|
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Frank Jackson (1998). From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford University Press.
Theodore Sider (2001). Four Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Tuomas E. Tahko (2015). Natural Kind Essentialism Revisited. Mind 124 (495):795-822.
Jamin Asay (2013). Truthmaking for Modal Skeptics. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (4):303-312.
Joshua C. Thurow (2013). The Defeater Version of Benacerraf's Problem for a Priori Knowledge. Synthese 190 (9):1587-1603.
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