Global supervenience and identity across times and worlds

Abstract
The existence and importance of supervenience principles for identity across times and worlds have been noted, but insufficient attention has been paid to their precise nature. Such attention is repaid with philosophical dividends. The issues in the formulation of the supervenience principles are two. The first involves the relevant variety of supervenience: that variety is global, but there are in fact two versions of global supervenience that must be distinguished. The second involves the subject matter: the names “identity over time” and “identity across worlds” are misnomers, for in neither case is identity at issue. The philosophical dividends then follow. Nathan Salmon’s argument that identity over time needs no “grounds” in matters of qualitative fact can be answered, as can an argument offered by many, that coincident objects would require objectionably ungrounded differences in identities across times and worlds
Keywords Identity  Metaphysics  Supervenience  World  Salmon, N
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Louis deRosset (2010). Getting Priority Straight. Philosophical Studies 149 (1):73 - 97.
Kit Fine (2008). Coincidence and Form. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 82 (1):101-118.
Karen Bennett (2004). Global Supervenience and Dependence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):501-529.

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