David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2):409-411 (2002)
In “Innocuous Infallibility,” Earl Conee argues that the infallibility to which I argue Internalism is committed, in “An Argument that Internalism Requires Infallibility,” is harmless and trivial. I maintain that this overlooks the fact that Internalism makes use of an intuitive notion of ‘epistemic twinhood’ to drive its position, rather than one antecedently defined with a filled-out notion of ‘relevant epistemic circumstances’. Conee is correct that any theory requires, and trivially gets, some sort of infallibility---but it is not trivial that there is a coherent and univocal notion of the sort of relevant circumstances---and so, twinhood and infallibility---behind the Internalist strategy and motivation.
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Andrew Moon (2012). Three Forms of Internalism and the New Evil Demon Problem. Episteme 9 (4):345-360.
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