Maximality and microphysical supervenience

Abstract
A property, F, is maximal i?, roughly, large parts of an F are not themselves Fs. Maximal properties are typically extrinsic, for their instantiation by x depends on what larger things x is part of. This makes trouble for a recent argument against microphysical superve- nience by Trenton Merricks. The argument assumes that conscious- ness is an intrinsic property, whereas consciousness is in fact maximal and extrinsic
Keywords Maximality  Metaphysics  Supervenience  Merricks, T
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References found in this work BETA
Eli Hirsch (1993). Dividing Reality. Oxford University Press.
Rae Langton & David Lewis (1998). Defining 'Intrinsic'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):333-345.

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Citations of this work BETA
Neil McKinnon (2008). A New Problem of the Many. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (230):80-97.

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