Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):139-149 (2003)
|Abstract||A property, F, is maximal i?, roughly, large parts of an F are not themselves Fs. Maximal properties are typically extrinsic, for their instantiation by x depends on what larger things x is part of. This makes trouble for a recent argument against microphysical superve- nience by Trenton Merricks. The argument assumes that conscious- ness is an intrinsic property, whereas consciousness is in fact maximal and extrinsic|
|Keywords||Maximality Metaphysics Supervenience Merricks, T|
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