In David John Chalmers, David Manley & Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford University Press (2009)
|Abstract||In , Peter van Inwagen asked a good question. (Asking the right question is often the hardest part.) He asked: what do you have to do to some objects to get them to compose something---to bring into existence some further thing made up of those objects? Glue them together or what?1 Some said that you don’t have to do anything.2 No matter what you do to the objects, they’ll always compose something further, no matter how they are arranged. Thus we learned of the fusion of the coins in our pockets and the Eiffel tower|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Michael C. Rea (1999). McGrath on Universalism. Analysis 59 (263):200–203.
Michael Scott (2000). Framing the Realism Question. Religious Studies 36 (4):455-471.
Kristie Miller (2008). Thing and Object. Acta Analytica 23 (1):69-89.
Robert T. Lehe (1998). Realism and Reality. Journal of Philosophical Research 23:219-237.
Antti Keskinen (2012). Quine on Objects: Realism or Anti-Realism? Theoria 78 (2):128-145.
William F. Vallicella (2003). A Tension in Quine's Theory of Existence. Philo 6 (2):193-204.
J. Wolff (2012). Do Objects Depend on Structures? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (3):607-625.
David J. Chalmers (2009). Ontological Anti-Realism. In David John Chalmers, David Manley & Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford University Press.
Theodore Sider (1993). Van Inwagen and the Possibility of Gunk. Analysis 53 (4):285 - 289.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads188 ( #1,570 of 556,908 )
Recent downloads (6 months)10 ( #7,600 of 556,908 )
How can I increase my downloads?