Philosophical Studies 128 (3):669 - 682 (2006)
|Abstract||Millianism says that the semantic content of a name (or indexical) is simply its referent. This thesis arises within a general, powerful research program, the propositionalist approach to semantics, which sets as a goal for philosophical semantics an assignment of entities — semantic contents — to bits of language, culminating in the assignment of propositions to sentences. Communication, linguistic competence, truth conditions, and other semantic phenomena are ultimately explained in terms of semantic contents. Over 100 years ago Frege (1952/1892) pointed out the problem with Millianism: sentences containing co-referential names seem semantically inequivalent. a=a is trivial, a priori, etc.; a=b is not, even if a and b have the same referent; φ(a) and φ(b) embed differently in the scope of propositional attitude verbs|
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