The worlds of possibility
Philosophical Review 110 (1):88-91 (2001)
| Abstract | Possible worlds present a formidable challenge for the lover of desert landscapes. One cannot ignore their usefulness; they provide, as David Lewis puts it, “a philosophers’ paradise”.1 But to enter paradise possibilia must be fit into a believable ontology. Some follow Lewis and accept worlds at face value, but most prefer some other choice from the current menu. Part of Chihara’s book is a critical discussion of some of these menu options: Lewis’s modal realism, Alvin Plantinga’s abstract modal realism, Graeme Forbes’s anti-realism and Gideon Rosen’s modal fictionalism. These discussions are very detailed and conversant with the literature. The discussions of Forbes (pp. 142-167) and of paradox within Plantinga’s system (pp. 120-141) are particularly enlightening. The rest of the book is devoted to Chihara’s positive project: developing an account of the status of model theory for non-modal logic, and then applying it to the modal case. The prize is an understanding of possible worlds semantics that requires no commitment to possible worlds at all (beyond the purely formal “possible worlds” of the standard Kripke-models.) What does the relativized notion of truth in an interpretation studied in (non-modal) model theory have to do with plain old truth? Chihara’s answer involves “connecting theorems” that relate truth-in to truth (chapter 5). A “natural-language proto-interpretation of the sentential calculus” (NLPI of SC) is a function that assigns meanings of declarative sentences of English to sentence letters. Where I is an NLPI of SC and φ is a sentence letter, Chihara uses ‘[φ/I ]’ to refer to “φ with the meaning it has been assigned by I ” (p. 191); where φ is not atomic, he says (p. 192). | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,679 |
| External links |
|
| Through your library | Configure |
Theodore Sider (2002). The Ersatz Pluriverse. Journal of Philosophy 99 (6):279-315.
Charles S. Chihara (1998). The Worlds of Possibility: Modal Realism and the Semantics of Modal Logic. Oxford University Press.
Charles Pigden & Rebecca E. B. Entwisle (2012). Spread Worlds, Plenitude and Modal Realism: A Problem for David Lewis. In James Maclaurin (ed.), Rationis Defensor.
Mark Jago (2013). Against Yagisawa's Modal Realism. Analysis 73 (1):10-17.
Phillip Bricker (2006). David Lewis: On the Plurality of Worlds. In John Shand (ed.), Central Works of Philosophy, Vol. 5: The Twentieth Century: Quine and After. Acumen Publishing.
Dominic Gregory (2001). The Worlds of Possibility: Modal Realism and the Semantics of Modal Logic. Charles S. Chihara. Mind 110 (439):736-740.
Daniel Nolan (2004). Charles S. Chihara, the Worlds of Possibility, Modal Realism and the Semantics of Modal Logic. Studia Logica 76 (3):443-446.
Nicola Ciprotti (2006). A Puzzle About Restricted Recombination in Modal Realism. In Paolo Valore (ed.), Topics on General and Formal Ontology. Polimetrica.
Louis deRosset (2009). Possible Worlds I: Modal Realism. Philosophy Compass 4 (6):998-1008.
Takashi Yagisawa (2010). Worlds and Individuals, Possible and Otherwise. Oxford University Press.
Jiri Benovsky (2005). Branching Versus Divergent Possible Worlds. Kriterion 19:12-20.
Johan Benthem (1984). Possible Worlds Semantics: A Research Program That Cannot Fail? Studia Logica 43 (4):379 - 393.
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2010-09-12Total downloads22 ( #56,170 of 549,070 )Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #37,252 of 549,070 )How can I increase my downloads? |

