Review of Lynne Rudder Baker, Persons and Bodies [Book Review]
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Philosophy 99 (1):45-48 (2002)
Locke’s view that continuants are numerically distinct from their constituting hunks of matter is popular enough to be called the “standard account”.1 It was given its definitive contemporary statement by David Wiggins in Sameness and Substance2, and has been defended by many since. Baker’s interesting book contributes new arguments for this view, a new definition of ‘constitution’, and a sustained application to persons and human animals. Much of what she says develops this view in new and important ways. But in some cases she does not advance the position, and in others she takes steps backwards. According to Baker, a person is numerically distinct from her constituting animal. One of Baker’s leading arguments is surprisingly unconvincing. Persons differ in important ways from non-human animals. Only persons are moral agents, modify their goals, have wars, culture, etc. If persons were identical to animals—if we were “nothing but animals”, as she puts it—then the manifest discontinuity between humans and non-human animals would be located “within the domain of biology”. “But from a biological point of view, human animals…are biologically continuous with non-human animals.” (p. 17) The argument fails: why should identifying persons with animals preclude saying that these particular animals have radically distinctive features that are of little interest to biologists? The traditional case for non-identity (which Baker accepts) is more powerful: a person and her constituting animal differ by having different persistence conditions. If my memories were transferred to a new body and my old body destroyed, I the person might survive, but the human animal who constituted me would perish. Therefore, before the transfer, I and the animal that constituted me would be numerically distinct but extremely similar things located in exactly the same place. This consequence—the central thesis of the Wiggins view—is surprising: so surprising that some reject the Wiggins view on that basis..
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Citations of this work BETA
Karen Bennett (2011). Construction Area (No Hard Hat Required). Philosophical Studies 154 (1):79-104.
Ryan Wasserman (2004). The Constitution Question. Noûs 38 (4):693 - 710.
Nick Zangwill (2012). Constitution and Causation. Metaphysica 13 (1):1-6.
Joseph Jedwab (2013). A Critique of Baker's Constitution View. Metaphysica 14 (1):47-62.
Tomasz Kakol (2005). The Samep-Relation as a Response to Critics of Baker's Theory of Constitution. Journal of Philosophical Logic 34 (5/6):561 - 579.
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