David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Oxford University Press (2011)
In order to perfectly describe the world, it is not enough to speak truly. In this ambitious and ground-breaking book, Theodore Sider argues that for a representation to be fully successful, truth is not enough; the representation must also use the right concepts--concepts that 'carve at the joints'--so that its conceptual structure matches reality's structure. There is an objectively correct way to 'write the book of the world'. Sider's argument begins from the assertion that metaphysics is about the fundamental structure of reality. Not about what's necessarily true; not about what properties are essential; not about conceptual analysis; and not about what there is. While inquiry into necessity, essence, concepts, or ontology might help to illuminate reality's structure, the ultimate goal is insight into this structure. Sider argues that part of the theory of structure is an account of how structure connects to other concepts. For example, structure can be used to illuminate laws of nature, explanation, reference, induction, physical geometry, substantivity, conventionality, objectivity, and metametaphysics. Another part is an account of how structure behaves. Since structure is a way of thinking about fundamentality, Sider's account implies distinctive answers to questions about the nature of fundamentality. These answers distinguish his theory of structure from other recent theories of fundamentality, including Kit Fine's theory of ground and reality, the theory of truthmaking, and Jonathan Schaffer's theory of ontological dependence.
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Citations of this work BETA
Chad Carmichael (2015). Deep Platonism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (1).
Alexander Skiles (2015). Against Grounding Necessitarianism. Erkenntnis 80 (4):717-751.
Gabriel Oak Rabin & Brian Rabern (forthcoming). Well Founding Grounding Grounding. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-31.
Bradley Rettler (forthcoming). The General Truthmaker View of Ontological Commitment. Philosophical Studies:1-21.
Karen Bennett (forthcoming). There is No Special Problem with Metaphysics. Philosophical Studies:1-17.
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