Yet another paper on the supervenience argument against coincident entities

Statues and lumps of clay are said by some to coincide - to be numerically distinct despite being made up of the same parts. They are said to be numerically distinct because they differ modally. Coincident objects would be non-modally indiscernible, and thus appear to violate the supervenience of modal properties on nonmodal properties. But coincidence and supervenience are in fact consistent if the most fundamental modal features are not properties, but are rather relations that are symmetric as between coincident entities, relations such as "opposite-possibly surviving being squashed"
Keywords Coincidence  Supervenience
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DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00212.x
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References found in this work BETA
Theodore Sider (2007). Parthood. Philosophical Review 116 (1):51-91.
Kit Fine (2001). The Question of Realism. Philosophers' Imprint 1 (1):1-30.

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Citations of this work BETA
Louis deRosset (2010). Getting Priority Straight. Philosophical Studies 149 (1):73-97.
Daniel Z. Korman (2016). Ordinary Objects. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Louis deRosset (2011). What is the Grounding Problem? Philosophical Studies 156 (2):173-197.

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