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Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification
Noûs 46 (2) (2012)
Abstract
In this paper I argue that it's possible that the contents of some visual experiences are influenced by the subject's prior beliefs, hopes, suspicions, desires, fears or other mental states, and that this possibility places constraints on the theory of perceptual justification that 'dogmatism' or 'phenomenal conservativism' cannot respect.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Cognition does not affect perception: Evaluating the evidence for “top-down” effects.Chaz Firestone & Brian J. Scholl - 2016 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 39:1-72.
I—Culture and Critique.Sally Haslanger - 2017 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 91 (1):149-173.
Why open-minded people should endorse dogmatism.Chris Tucker - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):529-545.
Perceiving and Desiring: A New Look at the Cognitive Penetrability of Experience.Dustin Stokes - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (3):479-92.
Circularity, reliability, and the cognitive penetrability of perception.Jack Lyons - 2011 - Philosophical Issues 21 (1):289-311.
References found in this work
Internalism defended.Earl Conee & Richard Feldman - 2001 - In Hilary Kornblith (ed.), American Philosophical Quarterly. Blackwell. pp. 1 - 18.
The perils of dogmatism.Crispin Wright - 2007 - In Nuccetelli & Seay (eds.), Themes from G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
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