Can Selection Effects on Experience Influence its Rational Role?

In Tamar Gendler (ed.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology volume 4. Oxford. 240 (2013)
Abstract
I distinguish between two kinds of selection effects on experience: selection of objects or features for experience, and anti-selection of experiences for cognitive uptake. I discuss the idea that both kinds of selection effects can lead to a form of confirmation bias at the level of perception, and argue that when this happens, selection effects can influence the rational role of experience.
Keywords perception  doxastic justification  attention  propositional justification  belief  modularity  cognitive penetration
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