Can Selection Effects on Experience Influence its Rational Role?
In Tamar Gendler (ed.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology volume 4. Oxford (2013)
| Abstract | I distinguish between two kinds of selection effects on experience: selection of objects or features for experience, and anti-selection of experiences for cognitive uptake. I discuss the idea that both kinds of selection effects can lead to a form of confirmation bias at the level of perception, and argue that when this happens, selection effects can influence the rational role of experience. | |||||||||
| Keywords | perception doxastic justification attention propositional justification belief modularity cognitive penetration | |||||||||
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