Instrumental rationality and naturalized philosophy of science

Philosophy of Science 63 (3):124 (1996)
In two recent papers, I criticized Ronald N. Giere's and Larry Laudan's arguments for 'naturalizing' the philosophy of science (Siegel 1989, 1990). Both Giere and Laudan replied to my criticisms (Giere 1989, Laudan 1990b). The key issue arising in both interchanges is these naturalists' embrace of instrumental conceptions of rationality, and their concomitant rejection of non-instrumental conceptions of that key normative notion. In this reply I argue that their accounts of science's rationality as exclusively instrumental fail, and consequently that their cases for 'normatively naturalizing' the philosophy of science fail as well
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DOI 10.1086/289943
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Thomas Kelly (2003). Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):612–640.
Jonathan Knowles (2002). What's Really Wrong with Laudan's Normative Naturalism. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 16 (2):171 – 186.
Harvey Siegel (2005). Neither Humean nor (Fully) Kantian Be: Reply to Cuypers. Journal of Philosophy of Education 39 (3):535–547.
H. Siegel (1998). Hooker's Revolutionary Regulatory Realism. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 29 (1):129-141.

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