Neural and super-Turing computing
Minds and Machines 13 (1):103-114 (2003)
| Abstract | ``Neural computing'' is a research field based on perceiving the human brain as an information system. This system reads its input continuously via the different senses, encodes data into various biophysical variables such as membrane potentials or neural firing rates, stores information using different kinds of memories (e.g., short-term memory, long-term memory, associative memory), performs some operations called ``computation'', and outputs onto various channels, including motor control commands, decisions, thoughts, and feelings. We show a natural model of neural computing that gives rise to hyper-computation. Rigorous mathematical analysis is applied, explicating our model's exact computational power and how it changes with the change of parameters. Our analog neural network allows for supra-Turing power while keeping track of computational constraints, and thus embeds a possible answer to the superiority of the biological intelligence within the framework of classical computer science. We further propose it as standard in the field of analog computation, functioning in a role similar to that of the universal Turing machine in digital computation. In particular an analog of the Church-Turing thesis of digital computation is stated where the neural network takes place of the Turing machine | |||||||||
| Keywords | Chaos Computation Logic Neuron Turing Machines | |||||||||
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Jack Copeland (1999). Beyond the Universal Turing Machine. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (1):46-67.
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B. Jack Copeland & Oron Shagrir (2011). Do Accelerating Turing Machines Compute the Uncomputable? Minds and Machines 21 (2):221-239.
Dina Goldin & Peter Wegner (2008). The Interactive Nature of Computing: Refuting the Strong Church–Turing Thesis. Minds and Machines 18 (1).
Jack Copeland (1996). On Alan Turing's Anticipation of Connectionism. Synthese 108 (3):361-377.
Peter Kugel (2002). Computing Machines Can't Be Intelligent (...And Turing Said So). Minds and Machines 12 (4):563-579.
Paolo Cotogno (2003). Hypercomputation and the Physical Church-Turing Thesis. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (2):181-223.
B. Maclennan (2003). Transcending Turing Computability. Minds and Machines 13 (1):3-22.
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