Philosophical Review 111 (1) (2002)
|Abstract||First, what it is for a sentient being to sense is for it to employ two distinct capacities: one for representing places-at-times; the other for representing "features" (60, cf. 70). Exercised together, the result is akin to feature-placing, which brings us to the second thesis: what sensory systems represent is that features are instantiated at place-times. Accordingly, sensory systems do not, for instance, attribute properties to objects, such as trees, tables, bodies, or persons (163)|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Austen Clark (1992). Sensory Qualities. Clarendon.
Austen Clark (2001). Some Logical Features of Feature Integration. In Werner Backhaus (ed.), Neuronal Coding of Perceptual Systems. World Scientific.
Austen Clark, Thoughts on Sensory Representation: A Commentary on S a Theory of Sentience Joseph Levine.
Joseph Levine (2004). Thoughts on Sensory Representation: A Commentary on Austen Clark's a Theory of Sentience. Philosophical Psychology 17 (4):541-551.
Austen Clark (2004). Feature-Placing and Proto-Objects. Philosophical Psychology 17 (4):443-469.
Brian P. Keane (2008). On Representing Objects with a Language of Sentience. Philosophical Psychology 21 (1):113 – 127.
Jonathan Cohen (2004). Objects, Places, and Perception. Philosophical Psychology 17 (4):471-495.
Mohan P. Matthen (2004). Features, Places, and Things: Reflections on Austen Clark's Theory of Sentience. Philosophical Psychology 17 (4):497-518.
Austen Clark (2000). A Theory of Sentience. New York: Oxford University Press.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads21 ( #59,615 of 556,837 )
Recent downloads (6 months)7 ( #11,112 of 556,837 )
How can I increase my downloads?