David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Neuroethics 3 (2):121-133 (2010)
Many philosophers ignore developments in the behavioral, cognitive, and neurosciences that purport to challenge our ideas of free will and responsibility. The reason for this is that the challenge is often framed as a denial of the idea that we are able to act differently than we do. However, most philosophers think that the ability to do otherwise is irrelevant to responsibility and free will. Rather it is our ability to act for reasons that is crucial. We argue that the scientific findings indicate that it is not so obvious that our views of free will and responsibility can be grounded in the ability to act for reasons without introducing metaphysical obscurities. This poses a challenge to philosophers. We draw the conclusion that philosophers are wrong not to address the recent scientific developments and that scientists are mistaken in formulating their challenge in terms of the freedom to do otherwise.
|Keywords||Compatibilism Acting for reasons Reasons-responsiveness Personal responsibility Free will Determinism|
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References found in this work BETA
Robert H. Kane (1996). The Significance of Free Will. Oxford University Press.
John M. Doris (2002). Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior. Cambridge University Press.
John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza (1998). Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Cambridge University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Kimberly R. Laurene, Richard F. Rakos, Marie S. Tisak, Allyson L. Robichaud & Michael Horvath (2011). Perception of Free Will: The Perspective of Incarcerated Adolescent and Adult Offenders. [REVIEW] Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (4):723-740.
Paul C. Snelling (2015). Who Can Blame Who for What and How in Responsibility for Health? Nursing Philosophy 16 (1):3-18.
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