The epistemic impact of the etiology of experience

Philosophical Studies 162 (3):697-722 (2013)
Abstract
In this paper I offer a theory of what makes certain influences on visual experiences by prior mental states (including desires, beliefs, moods, and fears) reduce the justificatory force of those experiences. The main idea is that experiences, like beliefs, can have rationally assessable etiologies, and when those etiologies are irrational, the experiences are epistemically downgraded.
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PhilPapers Archive Susanna Siegel, The epistemic impact of the etiology of experience
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References found in this work BETA
Richard Feldman & Earl Conee (2001). Internalism Defended. American Philosophical Quarterly 38 (1):1 - 18.

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Citations of this work BETA
Robert Cowan (2013). Perceptual Intuitionism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (3):n/a-n/a.
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