The epistemic impact of the etiology of experience

Philosophical Studies 162 (3):697-722 (2013)
In this paper I offer a theory of what makes certain influences on visual experiences by prior mental states (including desires, beliefs, moods, and fears) reduce the justificatory force of those experiences. The main idea is that experiences, like beliefs, can have rationally assessable etiologies, and when those etiologies are irrational, the experiences are epistemically downgraded.
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-0059-5
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PhilPapers Archive Susanna Siegel, The epistemic impact of the etiology of experience
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References found in this work BETA
John Searle (1983). Intentionality. Oxford University Press.
John McDowell (1994). Mind and World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

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