David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Law and Philosophy 25 (6):571 - 612 (2006)
The criminal law depends upon 'commonsense' or 'folk' psychology, a seemingly innate theory used by all normal human beings as a means to understand and predict other humans' behavior. This paper discusses two major types of arguments that commonsense psychology is not a true theory of human behavior, and thus should be eliminated and replaced. The paper argues that eliminitivist projects fail to provide evidence that commonsense psychology is a false theory, and argues that there is no need to seek a replacement theory of behavior for use in the criminal law.
|Keywords||Law Logic Philosophy of Law Law Theory/Law Philosophy Political Science Social Issues|
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Citations of this work BETA
Katrina L. Sifferd (2014). What Does It Mean to Be a Mechanism? Stephen Morse, Non-Reductivism, and Mental Causation. Criminal Law and Philosophy:1-17.
Stephen J. Morse (2011). Genetics and Criminal Responsibility. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (9):378-380.
Katrina Sifferd & William Hirstein (2012). On the Criminal Culpability of Successful and Unsucessful Psychopaths. Neuroethics 6 (1):129-140.
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