Basic Justification and the Moorean Response to the Skeptic

Abstract
My focus will be on two questions about Moore’s justification to believe the premises and the conclusion of the argument above. At stake is what makes it possible for our experiences to justify our beliefs, and what makes it possible for us to be justified in disbelieving skeptical..
Keywords Epistemology of perception  Transmission of warrant  Skepticism
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    Nicholas Silins (2013). Introspection and Inference. Philosophical Studies 163 (2):291-315.
    Sinan Dogramaci (2013). Intuitions for Inferences. Philosophical Studies 165 (2):371-399.
    Farid Masrour (2011). In Defense of Epistemic Modesty. Philosophical Issues 21 (1):312-331.
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