Dynamics, Agency and Intentional Action

Abstract The complex systems approach to cognitive science invites a new understanding of extended cognitive systems. According to this understanding, extended cognitive systems are heterogenous, composed of brain, body, and niche, non-linearly coupled to one another. In our previous work, we have argued that this view of cognitive systems, as non-linearly coupled brain-body-niche systems, promises conceptual and methodological advances on a series of traditional philosophical problems concerning cognition, reductionism, and consciousness. In this paper, we discuss agency and intentional action in light of this view of cognition.
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