David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Studies 164 (3):579-589 (2013)
An argument is epistemically self-defeating when either the truth of an argument’s conclusion or belief in an argument’s conclusion defeats one’s justification to believe at least one of that argument’s premises. Some extant defenses of the evidentiary value of intuition have invoked considerations of epistemic self-defeat in their defense. I argue that there is one kind of argument against intuition, an unreliability argument, which, even if epistemically self-defeating, can still imply that we are not justified in thinking intuition has evidentiary value
|Keywords||Intuition Philosophical methodology Justification Skepticism Self-defeating arguments|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
George Bealer (1992). The Incoherence of Empiricism. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 66:99-138.
John M. DePoe (2011). Defeating the Self-Defeat Argument for Phenomenal Conservativism. Philosophical Studies 152 (3):347-359.
Ali Hasan (2013). Phenomenal Conservatism, Classical Foundationalism, and Internalist Justification. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):119-141.
Dylan Dodd (2012). Evidentialism and Skeptical Arguments. Synthese 189 (2):337-352.
Moti Mizrahi (2013). More Intuition Mongering. The Reasoner 7 (1):5-6.
John L. Pollock (1991). Self-Defeating Arguments. Minds and Machines 1 (4):367-392.
Steven D. Hales (2012). The Faculty of Intuition. Analytic Philosophy 53 (2):180-207.
Moti Mizrahi (2012). Intuition Mongering. The Reasoner 6 (11):169-170.
Ernest Sosa (1996). Rational Intuition: Bealer on its Nature and Epistemic Status. Philosophical Studies 81 (2-3):151--162.
Stefano Caputo (2013). The Dependence of Truth on Being: Is There a Problem for Minimalism? In Miguel Hoeltje, Benjamin Schnieder & Alex Steinberg (eds.), Ontological Dependence, Supervenience, and Response-Dependence. Basic Philosophical Concepts Series,. Philosophia Verlag. 297-324.
Lisa Shabel (2004). Kant's "Argument From Geometry". Journal of the History of Philosophy 42 (2):195-215.
Added to index2012-02-02
Total downloads459 ( #206 of 1,005,073 )
Recent downloads (6 months)111 ( #156 of 1,005,073 )
How can I increase my downloads?