David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):501-514 (2013)
Conservatism about perceptual justification tells us that we cannot have perceptual justification to believe p unless we also have justification to believe that perceptual experiences are reliable. There are many ways to maintain this thesis, ways that have not been sufficiently appreciated. Most of these ways lead to at least one of two problems. The first is an over-intellectualization problem, whereas the second problem concerns the satisfaction of the epistemic basing requirement on justified belief. I argue that there is at least one Conservative view that survives both difficulties, a view which has the further ability to undercut a crucial consideration that has supported Dogmatist views about perceptual justification. The final section explores a tension between Conservatism and the prospects of having a completely general account of propositional justification. Ironically, the problem is that Conservatives seem committed to making the acquisition of propositional justification too easy. My partial defense of Conservatism concludes by suggesting possible solutions to this problem.
|Keywords||conservatism dogmatism perceptual justification propositional justification doxastic justification epistemic basing grounds entitlements easy justification|
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References found in this work BETA
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James Pryor (2000). The Skeptic and the Dogmatist. Noûs 34 (4):517–549.
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Citations of this work BETA
Paul Silva Jr (2014). Does Doxastic Justification Have a Basing Requirement? Australasian Journal of Philosophy (2):1-17.
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