In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford (forthcoming)
|Abstract||I investigate the way in which our conscious judgments can be a guide to our beliefs, a topic discussed by Gareth Evans, Richard Moran, Christopher Peacocke, and Alex Byrne, among others. I argue that our conscious judgments can give us a kind of justification to self-ascribe beliefs which is (i) distinctively first-personal, (ii) non-inferential, and (iii) fallible. I then defend my view from a challenge from "constitutivist" views in the epistemology of introspection, defended by philosophers such as Sydney Shoemaker, according to which only our beliefs themselves give us justification to self-ascribe beliefs.|
|Keywords||self-knowledge transparency of belief judgment constitutivism Moore's Paradox anti-luminosity fallibilism transparency of belief judgment constitutivism Moore's Paradox anti-luminosity fallibilism|
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