David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (1):69-88 (2013)
The special composition question asks, roughly, under what conditions composition occurs. The common sense view is that composition only occurs among some things and that all and only ‘ordinary objects’ exist. Peter van Inwagen has marshaled a devastating argument against this view. The common sense view appears to commit one to giving what van Inwagen calls a ‘series-style answer’ to the special composition question, but van Inwagen argues that series-style answers are impossible because they are inconsistent with the transitivity of parthood. In what follows I answer this objection in addition to other, less troubling objections raised by van Inwagen
|Keywords||transitivity of parthood ordinary objects special composition question mereology metaphysics|
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References found in this work BETA
H. Hudson (2002). The Liberal View of Receptacles. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (4):432 – 439.
Mark Johnston (2002). Parts and Principles. Philosophical Topics 30 (1):129-166.
Kathrin Koslicki (2008). The Structure of Objects. Oxford University Press.
E. J. Lowe (1989). Kinds of Being: A Study of Individuation, Identity, and the Logic of Sortal Terms. Blackwell.
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