On The Conceivability of Zombies

In this paper I begin by explaining the concept of supervenience. I then describe the problem of qualia and explain why qualia are a problem for physicalist theories of the mind. Next, I outline the zombie argument and explain Chalmers' attempt to use it as an argument for the conclusion that qualia do not logically supervene on the physical. My goal is to show that the supposed conceivability of zombies does not offer any serious refutation of physicalist theories of the mind.
Keywords philosophical zombies  problem of qualia  consciousness
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Paul G. Skokowski (2002). I, Zombie. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (1):1-9.
Robert Kirk (2008). The Inconceivability of Zombies. Philosophical Studies 139 (1):73-89.

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