Graduate studies at Western
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52 (2):146 – 153 (1974)
|Abstract||A number of philosophers have accepted the thesis that reasons for action are 'universalizable' in the sense that every such reason commits one to a universal prescription or practical judgment. The purpose of the present paper is to refute this thesis. The author presents and defends counterexamples to both strong and weak versions of the thesis, And shows that the thesis can be given up without denying the general contention that 'reason'-Statements imply universals|
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