David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Review of Symbolic Logic 1 (4):514-529 (2008)
Among the many possible approaches to dealing with logical omniscience, I consider here awareness and impossible worlds structures. The former approach, pioneered by Fagin and Halpern, distinguishes between implicit and explicit knowledge, and avoids logical omniscience with respect to explicit knowledge. The latter, developed by Rantala and by Hintikka, allows for the existence of logically impossible worlds to which the agents are taken to have access; since such worlds need not behave consistently, the agents’ knowledge is fallible relative to logical omniscience. The two approaches are known to be equally expressive in propositional systems interpreted over Kripke semantics. In this paper I show that the two approaches are equally expressive in propositional systems interpreted over Montague-Scott (neighborhood) semantics. Furthermore, I provide predicate systems of both awareness and impossible worlds structures interpreted on neighborhood semantics and prove the two systems to be equally expressive
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Cristina Bicchieri (2006). The Grammar of Society: The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms. Cambridge University Press.
Brian F. Chellas (1980). Modal Logic: An Introduction. Cambridge University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Jan Heylen (2013). Modal-Epistemic Arithmetic and the Problem of Quantifying In. Synthese 190 (1):89-111.
Giacomo Sillari (2008). Common Knowledge and Convention. Topoi 27 (1-2):29-39.
Graham Priest (2009). Neighborhood Semantics for Intentional Operators. Review of Symbolic Logic 2 (2):360-373.
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