David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Mind 120 (478):329-367 (2011)
Suppose our visual experiences immediately justify some of our beliefs about the external world — that is, justify them in a way that does not rely on our having independent reason to hold any background belief. A key question now arises: Which of our beliefs about the external world can be immediately justified by experiences? I address this question in epistemology by doing some philosophy of mind. In particular, I evaluate the following proposal: if your experience e immediately justifies you in believing that p , then (i) e has the content that p , and (ii) e ’s having the content that p is fixed by what it is like to have e . I start by clarifying this proposal and surveying the case in its favour. I then argue against the proposal and develop an alternative. The discussion shows what role visual consciousness plays and does not play in the justification of perceptual beliefs
|Keywords||epistemology of perception content of perception|
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References found in this work BETA
Alex Byrne (2001). Intentionalism Defended. Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.
Jeff Speaks (2005). Is There a Problem About Nonconceptual Content? Philosophical Review 114 (3):359-98.
Charles S. Travis (2004). The Silence of the Senses. Mind 113 (449):57-94.
Citations of this work BETA
Susanna Siegel (2013). The Epistemic Impact of the Etiology of Experience. Philosophical Studies 162 (3):697-722.
Nicholas Silins (2013). The Significance of High-Level Content. Philosophical Studies 162 (1):13-33.
Susanna Schellenberg (2014). The Epistemic Force of Perceptual Experience. Philosophical Studies 170 (1):87-100.
Susanna Siegel (2013). Reply to Fumerton, Huemer, and McGrath. Philosophical Studies 162 (3):749-757.
Adam Pautz (2011). Can Disjunctivists Explain Our Access to the Sensible World? Philosophical Issues 21 (1):384-433.
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