David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Vivarium 48 (3-4):245-278 (2011)
This article discusses the theories of perception of Robert Kilwardby and Peter of John Olivi. Our aim is to show how in challenging certain assumptions of medieval Aristotelian theories of perception they drew on Augustine and argued for the active nature of the soul in sense perception. For both Kilwardby and Olivi, the soul is not passive with respect to perceived objects; rather, it causes its own cognitive acts with respect to external objects and thus allows the subject to perceive them. We also show that Kilwardby and Olivi differ substantially regarding where the activity of the soul is directed to and the role of the sensible species in the process, and we demonstrate that there are similarities between their ideas of intentionality and the attention of the soul towards the corporeal world.
|Keywords||species soul attention Peter of John Olivi intentionality history of philosophy Robert Kilwardby medieval philosophy perception|
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Citations of this work BETA
Gloria Frost (2014). Peter Olivi's Rejection of God's Concurrence with Created Causes. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22 (4):655-679.
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