The Active Nature of the Soul in Sense Perception: Robert Kilwardby and Peter Olivi

Vivarium 48 (3-4):245-278 (2011)
Abstract This article discusses the theories of perception of Robert Kilwardby and Peter of John Olivi. Our aim is to show how in challenging certain assumptions of medieval Aristotelian theories of perception they drew on Augustine and argued for the active nature of the soul in sense perception. For both Kilwardby and Olivi, the soul is not passive with respect to perceived objects; rather, it causes its own cognitive acts with respect to external objects and thus allows the subject to perceive them. We also show that Kilwardby and Olivi differ substantially regarding where the activity of the soul is directed to and the role of the sensible species in the process, and we demonstrate that there are similarities between their ideas of intentionality and the attention of the soul towards the corporeal world
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 5,705
External links
  •   Try with proxy.
  • Through your library Configure

    Similar books and articles
    Christian Rode (2011). The Concept of Inner Experience in Peter John Olivi. Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch Fur Antike Und Mittelalter 13 (1):123-141.
    Robert Kilwardby (1987). On Time and Imagination =. Published for the British Academy by the Oxford University Press.
    José Filipe Silva (forthcoming). Robert Kilwardby. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Juhana Toivanen (2011). Peter of John Olivi on the Psychology of Animal Action. Journal of the History of Philosophy 49 (4):413-438.
    Juhana Toivanen (2007). Peter Olivi on Internal Senses. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 15 (3):427 – 454.
    Jennifer Matey (2012). Representing the Impossible. Philosophical Psychology 26 (2):188 - 206.

    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2010-11-13

    Total downloads

    30 ( #40,899 of 549,196 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    1 ( #63,397 of 549,196 )

    How can I increase my downloads?


    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.

    Other forums