A Semantics for Ontology

Dialectica 39 (3):193-215 (1985)
SummaryLeśniewski presented his logical systems in a way which conformed to his nominalism, so the question arises whether Leśniewski's logic can be given a natural formal semantics which, unlike current versions, avoids commitment to abstract entities. Building on hints in Wittgenstein's Tractatus, I develop the idea of a way of meaning which is the basis for what I call combinatorial semantics. I then consider whether this commits us to abstract objects or an intensional metalogic
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DOI 10.1111/j.1746-8361.1985.tb01257.x
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References found in this work BETA
Kevin Mulligan, Peter Simons & Barry Smith (1984). Truth-Makers. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (3):287 - 321.
Leon Henkin (1950). Completeness in the Theory of Types. Journal of Symbolic Logic 15 (2):81-91.
Hugues Leblanc (1976). Truth-Value Semantics. Distributor, Elsevier/North-Holland.

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Citations of this work BETA
Rafal Urbaniak (2008). Lesniewski and Russell's Paradox: Some Problems. History and Philosophy of Logic 29 (2):115-146.

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