Black ravens and a white shoe
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42 (3):339-342 (1991)
| Abstract | This paper provides an explanation of why sightings of black ravens increase the degree of warranted belief in the proposition that all ravens are black, while observations of white shoes do not. The explanation, which allows a Bayesian interpretation, rests on an assumption of the redundancy (i.e., lawfulness) of nature. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,701 |
| External links |
 |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesJon Williamson (2007). Inductive Influence. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (4):689 - 708.
Alexander Bird (2006). Selection and Explanation. In Alexander Bird (ed.), Rethinking Explanation.
Jacob Rosen (2012). Motion and Change in Aristotles Physics 5. 1. Phronesis 57 (1):63-99.
Malcolm R. Forster (1994). Non-Bayesian Foundations for Statistical Estimation, Prediction, and the Ravens Example. Erkenntnis 40 (3):357 - 376.
Ernest W. Adams (1988). Confirming Inexact Generalizations. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:10 - 16.
Robert J. Levy (1988). Regarding the Raven Paradox. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:17 - 23.
Norman Swartz (1973). Absolute Probability in Small Worlds: A New Paradox in Probability Theory. Philosophia 3 (2-3):167-178.
Mark Siebel (2004). Der Rabe Und der Bayesianist. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 35 (2):313 - 329.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads9 ( #114,124 of 549,118 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,361 of 549,118 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
