Counterfactuals, Overdetermination and Mental Causation
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (3):469-477 (2011)
| Abstract | The Exclusion Problem (EP) for mental causation suggests that there is a tension between the claim that the mental causes physical effects, and the claim that the mental does not overdetermine its physical effects. In response, Karen Bennett (2008, 2003) puts forward an extra necessary condition for overdetermination: if one candidate cause were to occur but the other were not to occur, the effect would still occur. She thus denies one of the assumptions of EP, the assumption that if an effect has two sufficient causes, it is overdetermined. If sound, her argument does two things: it solves EP, and it shows how to use counterfactuals in order to make the notion of overdetermination precise. However, the argument is not sound. | |||||||||
| Keywords | Counterfactuals Mental Causation Overdetermination Exclusion Karen Bennett Kim | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
  |
| External links | This entry has no external links. Add one. |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesSimona Aimar (2011). Counterfactuals, Overdetermination and Mental Causation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (3pt3):469-477.
Brandon Carey (2010). Overdetermination And The Exclusion Problem. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):251 - 262.
Michael Esfeld (2010). Causal Overdetermination for Humeans? Metaphysica 11 (2):99-104.
Daniel Lim (2011). Exclusion, Overdetermination, and Vacuity. Southwest Philosophy Review 27 (1):57-64.
Dwayne Moore (2012). Causal Exclusion and Dependent Overdetermination. Erkenntnis 76 (3):319-335.
Jesper Kallestrup (2006). The Causal Exclusion Argument. Philosophical Studies 131 (2):459-85.
David Papineau (forthcoming). Causation is Macroscopic but Not Irreducible. In E. J. Lowe & S. Gibb (eds.), The Ontology of Mental Causation.
Thomas D. Bontly (2005). Exclusion, Overdetermination, and the Nature of Causation. Journal of Philosophical Research 30:261-282.
Karen Bennett (2003). Why the Exclusion Problem Seems Intractable and How, Just Maybe, to Tract It. Noûs 37 (3):471-97.
Paul Raymont (2003). Kim on Overdetermination, Exclusion, and Nonreductive Physicalism. In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic.
Agustín Vicente (2004). The Overdetermination Argument Revisited. Minds and Machines 14 (3):331-47.
Eric Funkhouser (2002). Three Varieties of Causal Overdetermination. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 (4):335-351.
Sven Walter (2008). The Supervenience Argument, Overdetermination, and Causal Drainage: Assessing Kim's Master Argument. Philosophical Psychology 21 (5):673 – 696.
Amie L. Thomasson (1998). A Nonreductivist Solution to Mental Causation. Philosophical Studies 89 (2-3):181-95.
Steinvör Thöll Árnadóttir & Tim Crane (forthcoming). There is No Exclusion Problem. In Sophie C. Gibb & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Mental Causation and Ontology. Oxford University Press.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2011-12-19Total downloads78 ( #10,119 of 548,984 )Recent downloads (6 months)33 ( #1,186 of 548,984 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
