David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Environmental Ethics 31 (4):375-392 (2009)
Do we do anything wrong to animals simply by ending their lives if it causes them no pain or suffering? According to some, we can do no wrong to animals by killing them because animals do not have an interest in continued life. An attempt to ground an interest in continued life in animals’ desires faces the challenge that animals are supposedly incapable of desiring to live or of having the kinds of long-range desires which could be thwarted by death. Some philosophers argue that death harms animals not because it thwarts their desires, but rather because it forecloses their future opportunities for satisfaction. However, this argument is problematic because (1) it’s unclear that animals’ future opportunities belong to the same continuing selves and (2) it’s unclear why we should think that animals’ future opportunities have value for them. A more promising argument holds that many animals have an interest in continued life insofar as they possess certain enjoyments in life, where animals’ enjoyments are best understood not merely as fleeting experiences but rather as dispositional desires which animals continue to possess over time
|Keywords||animals rights killing interests life harm death desires|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Evelyn B. Pluhar (1988). When is It Morally Acceptable to Kill Animals? Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 1 (3):211-224.
Marc Bekoff (2008). Increasing Our Compassion Footprint: The Animals' Manifesto. Zygon 43 (4):771-781.
Peter Singer (1979). Killing Humans and Killing Animals. Inquiry 22 (1-4):145 – 156.
Steve F. Sapontzis (1995). We Should Not Allow Dissection of Animals. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 8 (2):181-189.
George S. Cave (1982). Animals, Heidegger, and the Right to Life. Environmental Ethics 4 (3):249-254.
Aysel Dog˘an (2011). A Defense of Animal Rights. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 24 (5):473-491.
Kay Peggs (2012). Animals and Sociology. Palgrave Macmillan.
Aaron Simmons (2009). Animals, Predators, the Right to Life, and the Duty to Save Lives. Ethics and the Environment 14 (1):pp. 15-27.
Michael Lockwood (1979). Singer on Killing and the Preference for Life. Inquiry 22 (1-4):157 – 170.
Alasdair Cochrane (2011). An Introduction to Animals and Political Theory. Palgrave Macmillan.
Elisa Aaltola (2005). Animal Ethics and Interest Conflicts. Ethics and the Environment 10 (1):19-48.
H. J. McCloskey (1979). Moral Rights and Animals. Inquiry 22 (1-4):23 – 54.
Hugh Lehman (1988). On the Moral Acceptability of Killing Animals. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 1 (2):155-162.
David Graham & Nathan Nobis (2007). Animals and Rights. Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 8 (2).
Added to index2011-01-09
Total downloads21 ( #88,131 of 1,139,847 )
Recent downloads (6 months)7 ( #28,326 of 1,139,847 )
How can I increase my downloads?