David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):549–579 (2003)
Descartes is often thought to bifurcate sensory experience into two distinct cognitive components: the sensing of secondary qualities and the more or less intellectual perceiving of primary qualities. A closer examination of his analysis of sensory perception in the Sixth Replies and his treatment of sensory processing in the Dioptrics and Treatise on Man teIls a different story. I argue that Descartes offers a unified cognitive account of sensory experience according to which the senses and intellect operate together to produce a fundamentally imagistic representation of the world in both its primary and secondary quality aspects. At stake here is not only our understanding of the cognitive structure of sensory experience but the relation of sense and intellect more generally in the Cartesian mind. The deep bifurcation in the Cartesian mind is not between the sensory perception of primary and secondary qualities but between sensory perception and purely intellectual perception.
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References found in this work BETA
Gary Hatfield (1986). The Senses and the Fleshless Eye: The Meditations as Cognitive Exercises. In Amelie Rorty (ed.), Essays on Descartes' Meditations. University of California Press 45–76.
Citations of this work BETA
Walter Ott (2014). Malebranche and the Riddle of Sensation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):689-712.
Gary Hatfield (2015). Natural Geometry in Descartes and Kepler. Res Philosophica 92 (1):117-148.
Sarah Patterson (2013). Descartes on Nature, Habit and the Corporeal World. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1):235-258.
Sarah Patterson (2016). Descartes on the Errors of the Senses. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 78:73-108.
Guy Longworth (2008). Comprehending Speech. Philosophical Perspectives 22 (1):339-373.
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