Religious Studies 33 (3):327-347 (1997)
|Abstract||This paper focuses on the question of whether divine passibility is metaphysically possible using the work of Hartshorne, Creel, Shields, Taliaferro and Sarot. Passibilism is seen to be difficult to assert because of the problem of radical particularity, which is the problem of how God might feel in exactitude the experience of many diverse creatures which are radically particular while also feeling different experiences of other equally radically particular beings. I conclude that the question of passibility is an unresolved problem and should be addressed from the perspective of specific attributes of God such as omniscience and omnipresence|
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