Does scientific discovery have a logic?

Philosophy of Science 40 (4):471-480 (1973)
It is often claimed that there can be no such thing as a logic of scientific discovery, but only a logic of verification. By 'logic of discovery' is usually meant a normative theory of discovery processes. The claim that such a normative theory is impossible is shown to be incorrect; and two examples are provided of domains where formal processes of varying efficacy for discovering lawfulness can be constructed and compared. The analysis shows how one can treat operationally and formally phenomena that have usually been dismissed with fuzzy labels like 'intuition' and 'creativity'
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J. W. McAllister (2003). Algorithmic Randomness in Empirical Data. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 34 (3):633-646.
Esther-Mirjam Sent (2001). Sent Simulating Simon Simulating Scientists. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 32 (3):479-500.

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