Necessary Intentionality: A Study in the Metaphysics of Aboutness

Oxford University Press (2012)
This book argues that words and thoughts are typically about whatever they are about necessarily rather than contingently. The argument proceeds by articulating a requisite modal background and then bringing this background to bear on cognitive matters, notably the intentionality of cognitive episodes and states. The modal picture that emerges from the first two chapters is a strongly particularist one whereby possibilities reduce to possibilities for particular things (or pluralities thereof) where the latter are determined by the natures of the particular things (or pluralities) involved. The next three chapters are devoted to the aboutness of referring terms in language and thought. The approach espoused is, again, strongly particularist in allotting explanatory priority to cognitive episodes and states regarding particular things (aka de re attitudes).
Keywords intentionality  modality  de re and de dicto  essence  cognitive attitudes
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Reprint years 2015
Call number B105.I56.S56 2012
ISBN(s) 9780199608515   9780198744160
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Suzanne Cunningham (1997). Two Faces of Intentionality. Philosophy of Science 64 (3):445-460.
Fred Dretske (1980). The Intentionality of Cognitive States. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):281-294.
Daniel C. Dennett & John Haugeland (1987). Intentionality. In Richard L. Gregory (ed.), Southwestern Journal of Philosophy. Oxford University Press 139-143.
Alberto Voltolini (2002). Why It is Hard to Naturalize Attitude Aboutness. In W. Hinzen & H. Rott (eds.), Belief and Meaning. Hänsel-Hohenhausen 157-179.
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