Nathan on Evidential Insatiability

Analysis 48 (1):57 - 59 (1988)
This is a response to a paper by N.M.L. Nathan in which he argues that the attempt to provide a global justification of our entire set of beliefs necessarily leads to an infinite regress, in contrast with cases of local uncertainty, which he thinks can be resolved without regress. I argue that if he is right about the local uncertainty case, then he should not fear a regress in the global case, as the two situations are more similar than he supposes.
Keywords justification  belief  regress  scepticism
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DOI 10.1093/analys/48.1.57
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