David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal of Philosophy 101 (10):527-554 (2004)
A problem inherited from Kripke is the reconciliation of commitments to various necessities with conflicting intuitions of contingency, intuitions that things "might have turned out otherwise." Kripke's reconciliation strategy is to say that while it is necessary that X is Y, and so impossible for X not to be Y, it is nevertheless epistemically possible for X not to be Y. But what are nonactual epistemic possibilities? Several answers are considered and it is concluded that scenarios adduced to explain away the target intuitions are either themselves impossible, or not fully coherent, or not epistemic in the relevant sense.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Raamy Majeed (forthcoming). Conceptual Instability and the New Epistemic Possibility. Erkenntnis:1-15.
Similar books and articles
Kent Bach (2009). Perspectives on Possibilities: Contextualism, Relativism, or What? In Andy Egan & B. Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality. Oxford University Press
Finn Spicer (2006). Epistemic Intuitions and Epistemic Contextualism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):366 - 385.
Adam Feltz (2008). Problems with the Appeal to Intuition in Epistemology. Philosophical Explorations 11 (2):131 – 141.
Michael Devitt (2010). What "Intuitions" Are Linguistic Evidence? Erkenntnis 73 (2):251 - 264.
Jennifer Nagel (2007). Epistemic Intuitions. Philosophy Compass 2 (6):792–819.
Brian Ribeiro (2011). Epistemic Akrasia. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 1 (1):18-25.
Olav Gjelsvik (1987). A Kripkean Objection to Kripke's Argument Against Identity-Theories. Inquiry 30 (4):435 – 450.
Mark Jago (2009). Logical Information and Epistemic Space. Synthese 167 (2):327 - 341.
Ori Simchen (2004). On The Impossibility of Nonactual Epistemic Possibilities. Journal of Philosophy 101 (10):527 - 554.
Added to index2009-05-06
Total downloads106 ( #28,497 of 1,726,249 )
Recent downloads (6 months)12 ( #56,985 of 1,726,249 )
How can I increase my downloads?