Journal of Philosophy 101 (10):527-554 (2004)
|Abstract||A problem inherited from Kripke is the reconciliation of commitments to various necessities with conflicting intuitions of contingency, intuitions that things "might have turned out otherwise." Kripke's reconciliation strategy is to say that while it is necessary that X is Y, and so impossible for X not to be Y, it is nevertheless epistemically possible for X not to be Y. But what are nonactual epistemic possibilities? Several answers are considered and it is concluded that scenarios adduced to explain away the target intuitions are either themselves impossible, or not fully coherent, or not epistemic in the relevant sense.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Kent Bach (2009). Perspectives on Possibilities: Contextualism, Relativism, or What? In Andy Egan & B. Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality. Oxford University Press.
Finn Spicer (2006). Epistemic Intuitions and Epistemic Contextualism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):366-385.
Adam Feltz (2008). Problems with the Appeal to Intuition in Epistemology. Philosophical Explorations 11 (2):131 – 141.
Jennifer Nagel (2007). Epistemic Intuitions. Philosophy Compass 2 (6):792–819.
Brian Ribeiro (2011). Epistemic Akrasia. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 1:18-25.
Olav Gjelsvik (1987). A Kripkean Objection to Kripke's Argument Against Identity-Theories. Inquiry 30 (4):435 – 450.
Mark Jago (2009). Logical Information and Epistemic Space. Synthese 167 (2):327 - 341.
Ori Simchen (2004). On The Impossibility of Nonactual Epistemic Possibilities. Journal of Philosophy 101 (10):527 - 554.
Added to index2009-05-06
Total downloads72 ( #11,693 of 549,119 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #15,205 of 549,119 )
How can I increase my downloads?