Two Arguments against Biological Interests
Environmental Ethics 32 (3):229-245 (2010)
| Abstract | In both environmental ethics and bioethics, one central issue is the range of entities that are morally considerable. According to one view on this issue, we ought to extend consideration to any entity that possesses interests. But what kinds of entities possess interests? Some philosophers have argued that only sentient beings can have interests, while others have held that all living organisms possess interests in the fulfillment of their biological functions. Is it true that all living organisms have biological interests? The standard arguments made against biological interests are unsatisfactory. There are two central reasons why we ought to reject the idea of biological interests: a metaphysical reason and a normative reason. First, the idea of biological interests implies a metaphysically mysterious account of the nature of how things come to have value for an entity. Second, as normative interests, the idea of biological interests implies that what is good for human beings is at least partly determined by things that are external to themselves, completely independent of their capacities for desires, conflicting with the individual ideal of self-direction, according to which it is fundamentally desirable that how we ought to live (or what is good for one) is grounded in one’s own capacities for desires. It is still an open possibility that nonsentient entities may be morally considerable in the sense of having intrinsic value | |||||||||
| Keywords | biocentrism plants interests sentience life consciousness considerability moral status | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,664 |
| External links |
 |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesFrederik Kaufman (1994). Machines, Sentience, and the Scope of Morality. Environmental Ethics 16 (1):57-70.
Frederik Kaufman (1994). Machines, Sentience, and the Scope of Morality. Environmental Ethics 16 (1):57-70.
Warren Neill (1998). An Emotocentric Theory of Interests. Environmental Ethics 20 (2):163-182.
Aaron Simmons (2012). Do Embryos Have Interests? Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 9 (1):57-66.
Harley Cahen (1988). Against the Moral Considerability of Ecosystems. Environmental Ethics 10 (3):195-216.
Eric T. Olson (2010). Ethics and the Generous Ontology. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (4):259-270.
John Rossi (2010). Is Equal Moral Consideration Really Compatible with Unequal Moral Status? Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 20 (3):251-276.
Lawrence E. Johnson (1992). Toward the Moral Considerability of Species and Ecosystems. Environmental Ethics 14 (2):145-157.
Kenneth E. Goodpaster (1980). On Stopping at Everything. Environmental Ethics 2 (3):281-284.
Kenneth E. Goodpaster (1980). On Stopping at Everything: A Reply to W. M. Hunt. Environmental Ethics 2 (3):281-284.
Raffaele Rodogno (2010). Sentientism, Wellbeing, and Environmentalism. Journal of Applied Philosophy 27 (1):84-99.
Lawrence E. Johnson (1983). Humanity, Holism, and Environmental Ethics. Environmental Ethics 5 (4):345-354.
Mark A. Michael (1996). To Swat or Not to Swat: Pesky Flies, Environmental Ethics, and the Supererogatory. Environmental Ethics 18 (2):165-180.
S. Stewart Braun (2010). Historical Entitlement and the Practice of Bequest: Is There a Moral Right of Bequest? Law and Philosophy 29 (6):695-715.
Gary E. Varner (1998). In Nature's Interests?: Interests, Animal Rights, and Environmental Ethics. Oxford University Press.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2011-01-09Total downloads14 ( #83,035 of 549,017 )Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #25,706 of 549,017 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
