David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Cambridge University Press (1993)
This book is about one of the most baffling of all paradoxes--the famous Liar paradox. Suppose we say: "We are lying now." Then if we are lying, we are telling the truth; and if we are telling the truth we are lying. This paradox is more than an intriguing puzzle, since it involves the concept of truth. Thus any coherent theory of truth must deal with the Liar. Keith Simmons discusses the solutions proposed by medieval philosophers and offers his own solutions and in the process assesses other contemporary attempts to solve the paradox. Unlike such attempts, Simmons' "singularity" solution does not abandon classical semantics and does not appeal to the kind of hierarchical view found in Barwise's and Etchemendy's The Liar. Moreover, Simmons' solution resolves the vexing problem of semantic universality--the problem of whether there are semantic concepts beyond the expressive reach of a natural language such as English.
|Keywords||Liar paradox Universals (Philosophy|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Buy the book||$31.80 new (12% off) $31.83 used (12% off) $35.99 direct from Amazon Amazon page|
|Call number||BC199.2.S56 1993|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Anil Gupta & Shawn Standefer (forthcoming). Conditionals in Theories of Truth. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-37.
Michael Glanzberg (2004). A Contextual-Hierarchical Approach to Truth and the Liar Paradox. Journal of Philosophical Logic 33 (1):27-88.
Matti Eklund (2002). Inconsistent Languages. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2):251-275.
Douglas Patterson (2009). Inconsistency Theories of Semantic Paradox. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2):387 - 422.
Hannes Leitgeb (2005). What Truth Depends On. Journal of Philosophical Logic 34 (2):155-192.
Similar books and articles
J. C. Beall (ed.) (2007). Revenge of the Liar: New Essays on the Paradox. Oxford University Press.
Gian Aldo Antonelli (1996). Book Review: Keith Simmons. Universality and the Liar: An Essay on Truth and the Diagonal Argument. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 37 (1):152-159.
Keith Simmons (1987). On a Medieval Solution to the Liar Paradox. History and Philosophy of Logic 8 (2):121-140.
Richard Heck (2012). A Liar Paradox. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):36-40.
Jeff Snapper (2012). The Liar Paradox in New Clothes. Analysis 72 (2):319-322.
Bradley Dowden (2001). Liar Paradox. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Kevin Scharp (2007). Alethic Vengeance. In J. C. Beall (ed.), Revenge of the Liar: New Essays on the Paradox. Oxford University Press
Shahid Rahman, Tero Tulenheimo & Emmanuel Genot (eds.) (2008). Unity, Truth and the Liar: The Modern Relevance of Medieval Solutions to the Liar Paradox. Springer.
Bradley Armour-Garb & J. C. Beall (2001). Can Deflationists Be Dialetheists? Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (6):593-608.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads35 ( #134,977 of 1,941,041 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #457,978 of 1,941,041 )
How can I increase my downloads?