Universality and the Liar: An Essay on Truth and the Diagonal Argument

Cambridge University Press (1993)
This book is about one of the most baffling of all paradoxes--the famous Liar paradox. Suppose we say: "We are lying now." Then if we are lying, we are telling the truth; and if we are telling the truth we are lying. This paradox is more than an intriguing puzzle, since it involves the concept of truth. Thus any coherent theory of truth must deal with the Liar. Keith Simmons discusses the solutions proposed by medieval philosophers and offers his own solutions and in the process assesses other contemporary attempts to solve the paradox. Unlike such attempts, Simmons' "singularity" solution does not abandon classical semantics and does not appeal to the kind of hierarchical view found in Barwise's and Etchemendy's The Liar. Moreover, Simmons' solution resolves the vexing problem of semantic universality--the problem of whether there are semantic concepts beyond the expressive reach of a natural language such as English.
Keywords Liar paradox  Universals (Philosophy
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Call number BC199.2.S56 1993
ISBN(s) 0521061393  
DOI 10.2307/2185639
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Douglas Patterson (2009). Inconsistency Theories of Semantic Paradox. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2):387 - 422.
Matti Eklund (2002). Inconsistent Languages. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2):251-275.
Hannes Leitgeb (2005). What Truth Depends On. Journal of Philosophical Logic 34 (2):155-192.

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