Social Epistemology 22 (3):257 – 270 (2008)
|Abstract||General contrastivism holds that all claims of reasons are relative to contrast classes. This approach applies to explanation (reasons why things happen), moral philosophy (reasons for action), and epistemology (reasons for belief), and it illuminates moral dilemmas, free will, and the grue paradox. In epistemology, contrast classes point toward an account of justified belief that is compatible with reliabilism and other externalisms. Contrast classes also provide a model for Pyrrhonian scepticism based on suspending belief about which contrast class is relevant. This view contrasts with contextualism, invariantism, and Schaffer's contrastivism|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Christopher Tollefsen (2006). Reasons for Action and Reasons for Belief. Social Epistemology 20 (1):55 – 65.
Peter Baumann (2008). Problems for Sinnott-Armstrong's Moral Contrastivism. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):463–470.
Andrew Reisner (2007). Evidentialism and the Numbers Game. Theoria 73 (4):304-316.
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2006). Moral Skepticisms. Oxford University Press.
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2008). Replies to Hough, Baumann and Blaauw. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):478-488.
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (1999). Explanation and Justification in Moral Epistemology. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 1:117-127.
Ram Neta (2008). Undermining the Case for Contrastivism. Social Epistemology 22 (3):289 – 304.
Jonathan Schaffer (2004). From Contextualism to Contrastivism. Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2):73-104.
Martijn Blaauw (2008). Contesting Pyrrhonian Contrastivism. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):471–477.
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2008). Moderate Classy Pyrrhonian Moral Scepticism. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):448–456.
Added to index2009-02-04
Total downloads50 ( #21,076 of 548,984 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #25,729 of 548,984 )
How can I increase my downloads?