A contrastivist manifesto

Social Epistemology 22 (3):257 – 270 (2008)
General contrastivism holds that all claims of reasons are relative to contrast classes. This approach applies to explanation (reasons why things happen), moral philosophy (reasons for action), and epistemology (reasons for belief), and it illuminates moral dilemmas, free will, and the grue paradox. In epistemology, contrast classes point toward an account of justified belief that is compatible with reliabilism and other externalisms. Contrast classes also provide a model for Pyrrhonian scepticism based on suspending belief about which contrast class is relevant. This view contrasts with contextualism, invariantism, and Schaffer's contrastivism.
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DOI 10.1080/02691720802546120
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Martijn Blaauw (2008). Contrastivism in Epistemology. Social Epistemology 22 (3):227 – 234.

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